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Concentration on the Las Vegas Strip:
An Exploration of the Impacts
David G. Schwartz
INTRODUCTION
Looking at two snapshots, albeit from a dis-tance, gives an overview of how concentrated
the gaming industry in Nevada has become:
 In 1998, 23 publicly held corporations owned
65 casinos that grossed more than $12 million
that year from gaming. These casinos grossed
75.48% of the state’s total gaming revenue
that fiscal year.
 In 2012, 22 publicly held corporations owned
70 casinos that grossed more than $12 million
that year from gambling, pulling in 78.0% of
that state’s total gaming revenue that fiscal
year.
On the surface, that doesn’t look like much change:
publicly held companies still number about the
same, and they still control approximately the
same market share in Nevada. But in the ensuing
14 years, a fundamental shift had changed the struc-
ture of casino ownership in Nevada, and particularly
along the Las Vegas Strip, as casino ownership be-
came concentrated in the hands of fewer, larger op-
erators.
In 1998, as seen in Table 1, there were 21 casinos
in the Las Vegas Strip corridor earning more than
$12 million annually, owned by a total of 12 com-
panies, including two casinos that were co-owned
by two companies each. In addition, six major casi-
nos were not owned by companies that the Nevada
Gaming Control Board qualified as ‘‘public’’: the
Hard Rock Hotel, the Frontier, Imperial Palace,
Westward Ho, the San Remo, and the Sahara. The
company with the largest Strip presence, Circus
Circus Enterprises, owned four properties outright,
with a 50% stake and a management contract for a
fifth. Counting the four non-corporate-owned casi-
nos, nine companies owned only a single casino
in the Strip corridor; three owned all or shares
in two; one owned three; and the last, Mirage
Resorts, owned three properties and had a 50%
interest in a fourth. That’s a fairly good distribution
of ownership.
Looking ahead to 2012, the picture had changed
(see Table 2).
Here, the picture is clearly different. Unlike in
1998, no casinos were owned by non-publicly-
traded companies in the Strip corridor. There are
two powerhouses: MGM, owning ten casinos; and
Caesars Entertainment, owning nine (in 2012, the
Gaming Control Board considered Slots-A-Fun as
part of Circus Circus, potentially boosting MGM’s
total to 11). The remaining seven owners had one
casino license each, though both Wynn (Wynn and
Encore) and Las Vegas Sands (Venetian and Pal-
azzo) operated two interconnected resorts. And
four casinos in the Strip corridor—the Hard Rock
Hotel, Palms, Treasure Island, and Hooters—were
not owned by publicly traded corporations.
This means that now two companies control be-
tween them 19 resorts, about 59% of the total mar-
ket by property count. Moreover, since the
unaffiliated resorts tend to be smaller than the
ones owned by Caesars and (particularly) MGM,
the companies’ total market share is likely higher
(since the companies do not separate out Strip earn-
ings in their financial filings, and the Gaming Con-
trol Board aggregates all area results in its reports, it
is beyond the scope of this analysis to determine the
precise market share of each company). Clearly, it’s
a misnomer to call this a monopoly, or even a
David G. Schwartz is the director of the Center for Gaming
Research at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, in Las
Vegas, NV.
GAMING LAW REVIEW AND ECONOMICS
Volume 17, Number 9, 2013
 Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
DOI: 10.1089/glre.2013.1794
619
duopoly, since there are several other ownership in-
terests in the Strip corridor, including two larger,
well-financed international gaming giants, Wynn
Resorts and Las Vegas Sands.
The overall impact of the consolidation spree that
led to the emergence of the two Strip behemoths,
however, may have significant impacts on the com-
panies themselves, the Nevada gaming industry
(whose continued health is of vital significance to
the larger state economy), and the visitors who, at
the base of it all, drive the gaming and tourist econ-
omy of Southern Nevada. Examining these impacts
more closely will provide some much-needed per-
spective on whether concentration of ownership in
the Las Vegas Strip market into so few hands was,
in retrospect, a sound or unsound series of decisions.
In fact, it appears that the impact on the individ-
ual operators has been negative; for the industry as a
whole, it has been neutral to negative; and for cus-
tomers, it has also been neutral to negative. The ac-
celerated concentration in casino ownership on the
Las Vegas Strip in the period 2000–2005 did not de-
stroy the industry, but it did not help it weather the
economic difficulties it was to face, either, and in-
deed likely contributed to those woes.
THE CONCENTRATION CHRONOLOGY
Concentration in the Las Vegas Strip (and national)
gaming industry didn’t happen overnight. Instead,
from a Las Vegas perspective, it was a process
that began in 1998, when Harrah’s Entertainment
acquired Showboat, Inc. At the time, this didn’t
seem like a major move—Harrah’s owned only a
single Las Vegas casino, as did Showboat, but it
Table 1. Publicly Traded Corporations Owning Las Vegas Strip Casinos, 1998
Company Aztar Boyd Circus Circus Coast Resorts Harrah’s Hilton
Casinos Tropicana Stardust Circus Circus Barbary Coast Harrah’s Bally’s




Company MGM Grand Mirage Primmadonna Rio Riviera Starwood
Casinos MGM Grand Boardwalk NY-NY** Rio Riviera Caesars Palace
NY-NY** Mirage Desert Inn
Treasure Island
Monte Carlo*
*JV between Circus, Mirage; **JV between MGM, Primmadonna.
All casinos earning more than $12 million in annual gaming income.
Source: Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1998 Nevada Gaming Abstract.
Table 2. Publicly Traded Corporations Owning Las Vegas Strip Casinos, 2012
Company Boyd Caesars Colony LV Sands MGM
Casinos Gold Coast Bally’s LVH Venetian Aria
Bill’s Bellagio
Caesars Palace Circus Circus
Flamingo Excalibur
Harrah’s Luxor





Company NV Prop Riviera Trop LV Wynn
Casinos Cosmopolitan Riviera Tropicana Wynn Las Vegas
All casinos earning more than $12 million in annual gaming income.
Source: Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2012 Nevada Gaming Abstract.
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was a harbinger of things to come. Harrah’s had, at
the time, an empire of a dozen casinos, which it had
grown organically with new construction since the
1980 merger of Harrah’s into Holiday Inns, Inc.
With the gaming properties spun off as Harrah’s
Entertainment in 1995, the company had become
a solid company with a broad regional base and,
thanks to the just-launched Total Gold (soon to
be Total Rewards) program, a commitment to
an interconnected player loyalty platform. Show-
boat had its Boulder Highway flagship casino, an
Indiana riverboat, an Atlantic City casino, and
the management contract for Sydney’s Star City
casino.
Upon buying Showboat, Harrah’s immediately
sold the Las Vegas property (which was renamed
the Castaways, but which within a decade had
been closed and demolished) and ditched the man-
agement contract, keeping the Atlantic City and
Indiana properties, which were incorporated into
Harrah’s Total Rewards system.
The Showboat acquisition evidently whet Har-
rah’s Entertainment’s appetite for addition by acqui-
sition, leading to a series of purchases that saw the
company increase its national reach and its Las
Vegas footprint over the next seven years, starting
with the acquisition of the Rio Hotel and Casino,
a property in the Strip corridor but off Las Vegas
Boulevard, in 1999. The following year, riverboat
operator Players International followed, with Har-
vey Casino Resorts’ casinos added to the fold in
2001. After that, Harrah’s bought a Louisiana race-
track and consolidated its ownership of Harrah’s
New Orleans, which was just a pause before the
moves that changed the company completely, giv-
ing it a new name and an expanded focus. In
2004, Harrah’s bought Binion’s Horseshoe; it
quickly sold the Downtown Las Vegas gambling
hall, but retained the rights to the Horseshoe name
in Southern Nevada and kept the World Series of
Poker. Harrah’s seized on the poker tournament’s
brand, running satellite tournaments throughout its
portfolio of properties. In the same year, Harrah’s
acquired the separately owned Horseshoe Gaming
Holding Corporation, which owned casinos in Mis-
sissippi, Louisiana, and Indiana.1
So far, so good: at this point, Harrah’s was al-
ready a company with a broad reach of properties
across the country and a small presence in Las
Vegas, with only the less-than-glamorous Harrah’s
on the Strip and the off-Strip Rio.
Then, in a merger announced in July 2004 and
completed in 2005, Harrah’s bought Caesars Enter-
tainment, a company that, through its own pickups,
had grown since its genesis in Hilton Hotels’ gaming
division with the acquisition of Bally Entertainment,
Grand Casinos, and Caesars World. Harrah’s Enter-
tainment now had six properties in the Strip corridor:
Rio, Harrah’s, Caesars Palace, the Flamingo, Bally’s,
and Paris (before the acquisition, Caesars had sold the
Las Vegas Hilton). The following year, Harrah’s in-
creased its international presence with the purchase
of London Clubs International. Then Harrah’s sold
off a few non-core properties in its national portfolio
while doubling down on the Strip. In 2005, it bought
the Imperial Palace, a budget-oriented casino between
Harrah’s Entertainment possessions Harrah’s and the
Flamingo, and two years later, it bought the Barbary
Coast from Boyd Gaming, giving the company a
solid block of real estate on the west side of Las
Vegas Boulevard from Harrah’s south to Paris.
Then, in 2010, the company reached even further,
with the acquisition of Planet Hollywood.
All of this buying was premised on the assump-
tion that real estate on the Las Vegas Strip was at
a premium, as was the 2008 acquisition of Harrah’s
by private equity firms Apollo Management and
TPG Capital. The belief that Las Vegas land was
the most valuable asset possible in the gaming
universe—to the exclusion of international expan-
sion opportunities—was, as the subsequent reces-
sion demonstrated, a critical strategic error. None
of the steps that Harrah’s took to assemble its
Strip empire seemed, at the time, audacious; yet,
when taken together, they gave the company a port-
folio of nearly half of the Strip’s casinos, and saw
formerly independent properties like the Rio, Planet
Hollywood, and Imperial Palace end up under a cor-
porate umbrella. When, in 2011, the company
renamed itself Caesars Entertainment, its imperial
ambitions were only confirmed.
But Caesars is only half the story of the consoli-
dation of the Las Vegas Strip’s casino market. The
other side begins with Kirk Kerkorian, who in
1967 bought the Flamingo and, two years later,
opened the International. Both casinos were subse-
quently bought by Hilton Hotels, beginning its
1Caesars Entertainment Corporation Company Profile,Univer-
sity of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) Center for Gaming
Research, <http://gaming.unlv.edu/abstract/fin_het.html> .
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involvement in the gaming industry. Kerkorian
stayed in the game, however, and in 1973 built the
original MGM Grand. After selling that casino
and its Reno cousin to Bally’s in 1986, Kerkorian
bought several casinos on the Strip, including the
Desert Inn (1986), Sands (1988), and Marina
(1989). Kerkorian didn’t own the Sands for long,
and he sold the Desert Inn to ITT-Sheraton in
1993, but he used the Marina as the cornerstone of
a new, larger MGM Grand at the corner of Las
Vegas Boulevard and Tropicana. In 1997, MGM
partnered in a joint venture with Primmadonna
Resorts, owner of three casino hotels on the
Nevada/California border at Primm, opening New
York-New York across from the MGM Grand on
the Strip.2
Two years later, MGM Grand acquired Primma-
donna, giving it 100 percent ownership of New
York-New York, but that was only a prologue. In
2000, the company bought Steve Wynn’s Mirage
Resorts for $6.4 billion.3 In one fell swoop, the
company’s Las Vegas presence ballooned from
two casinos to seven and half, with Downtown’s
Golden Nugget, the Mirage, Treasure Island, the
Bellagio, and 50 percent of Monte Carlo absorbed.
Reflecting its new identity, the company changed
its name to MGM Mirage.
Three years later, MGM Mirage downsized
slightly when it sold the Downtown and Laughlin
Golden Nuggets, but in 2005, the company just
about doubled its Strip footprint with the purchase
of the Mandalay Resort Group. The erstwhile Cir-
cus Circus Enterprises’ Las Vegas assets included
its Strip namesake, the Slots-A-Fun casino, 50 per-
cent (and management) of Monte Carlo, Excalibur,
Luxor, and Mandalay Bay.4
MGM Mirage then closed the Boardwalk and
began construction of CityCenter, a project that it
believed would change the nature of the Las
Vegas Strip. Along the way, due to financial prob-
lems brought on by over-expansion and the reces-
sion, the company sold Treasure Island for $775
million in 2008. Following the opening of CityCen-
ter, and amid rumors that the Mirage was an acqui-
sition target, the company in 2010 changed its name
to MGM Resorts International.
Coming without about a month of each other, the
two mega-transactions of 2005—MGM Mirage
buying Mandalay Resort Group and Harrah’s buy-
ing Caesars—trigged mild concerns about anti-
trust issues in the press. In some markets, such as
Detroit, the companies were required by statute to
divest properties. In others, the companies made
strategic decisions to offload casinos that didn’t fit
within their larger plan for growth.
In Las Vegas, some raised concerns that over-
concentration would damage the market as a
whole. Nevada, unlike some other states, does not
have any cap on the total number of licenses a prop-
erty can have statewide or within a single market.
Instead, the relevant statute5 specifies that, ‘‘the
board and commission shall consider whether
such multiple licensing is in the best interests of
the State of Nevada, having due regard for the
state’s policy concerning gaming.’’6 Specifically,
the decision to grant multiple licenses should con-
sider a variety of factors, including the overall via-
bility of the proposed new properties, that don’t
directly address market concentration. One criteria,
however, does: the Commission, in its licensing,
must consider, according to the statute, ‘‘What
would the result of the multiple licensing be of the
percentage of interest of the applicant to similarly
situated competitors on a statewide, countywide
and geographical location basis’’ in a variety of cat-
egories, including the total number of slot ma-
chines, total number of table games, gross
revenue, number of rooms, number of employees,
and total payroll.7
There are two other statutorily mandated red
flags for a merger:
8. Would acquisition pose problems or create a
monopoly?
9. Would acquisition pose problems in any of the
following categories:
(a) Becoming so large as to become its own sup-
plier of goods and services required by the li-
censee in all of its operations.
(b) Establishing employment practices inimical
to the welfare of the gaming industry.
2MGM Resorts International Company Profile, UNLV Center




5Nev. Rev. Stat. x 3.070.





(c) Establishment of control in method of play or
percentage realized from play that would be
inimical to the welfare of the gaming indus-
try.
(d) Without cause, the establishment of a sea-
sonal operation or reduced number of shifts
per day, inimical to the economy of the area.8
Unlike in other states, many of these questions
have answers that are purely subjective; there is no
definition of what ‘‘problems’’ an acquisition might
cause, and what exactly constitutes a monopoly—
presumably, its technical definition would be one
entity owning all non-restricted gaming locations
in the state. With those rather vague criteria, it
isn’t surprising that all of the acquisitions of the
late 1990s/mid-2000s received regulatory approval.
The lack of greater regulatory rigor regarding
concentration within markets like the Las Vegas
Strip, however, speaks to the bigger issue: no one
at the time seemed to care. One commentator,
when asked for his perspective by the Las Vegas
Sun, opined that ‘‘the consumer can get better ser-
vice with a big company.I see it as a vehicle to
help the consumer and give them a better deal.’’9
There were, of course, bigger questions that
should have been asked: what would the impact
on the companies themselves, and the market as a
whole, be? That they were not seriously asked at
the time of the mergers does not mean they are
not valid questions. Indeed, economist Bill Eading-
ton in 2011 wrote that, ‘‘One could argue, especially
in retrospect, that what was occurring in Las Vegas
by mid-decade was clearly ‘irrational exuberance’
on the investment scene.’’10
But looking more deeply at the impacts of the
Strip’s consolidation, we can begin to develop crite-
ria to allow, in the future, for a more circumspect ap-
proach to mergers within the gaming industry.
THE IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL
OPERATORS
The first area of impact to explore will be on the
individual operators. Those who ran gaming compa-
nies in the late 1990s and early 2000s had a variety
of growth strategies they could pursue. These in-
cluded: acquisition of rival properties; expansion
into new markets, both domestic and international;
and growth by building additional properties and
adding supply to mature markets. While the two
other Strip-based gaming giants, Wynn Resorts
and Las Vegas Sands, chose the latter two options
as their primary strategies (and continue to pursue
the second option, expansion into new markets,
today), MGM and Caesars chose to grow, particu-
larly in Las Vegas, through acquisitions.
Benefits to growing on the Strip through consol-
idation were three-fold. First, as a ‘‘real estate play,’’
buying both casinos and the land surrounding them
promised great dividends. With land prices on the
Strip rising with, seemingly, no end in sight, the
present seemed the best time to invest heavily in
Las Vegas real estate. Some land could be used to
build new resorts, and land currently used for low-
density, low revenue units, like MGM Grand’s
Grand Adventures theme park, could be repurposed
for higher yields: in that case, condominiums. If a
company could buy properties like Mandalay Bay
and, on some of the land surrounding the core
asset, build high-rise, high-density residential
units, it could both drive more business to the core
asset and provide a new revenue stream in the
form of condo sales and/or management fees for
leasing units. There was also the potential for new
casino developments, for imploding older casino re-
sorts to build newer, denser, more profitable ones,
and the possibility of constructing non-gaming ame-
nities, such as arenas, on excess land (the latter ex-
plains Harrah’s purchase of large tracts between its
East Strip properties and Koval Lane).
The second reason for buying multiple Las Vegas
properties was that it promised economies of scale,
both for labor and for purchasing power. This
includes combining back-of-the-house and support
functions for Strip resorts, which would lower unit
costs for all of the resorts. Why have 10 in-house
web design or legal departments (for example)
when one office could perform the function for
the entire portfolio? In addition, buying in bulk
quantities could create volume discounts, and the
additional clout given by suddenly controlling so
8Id.
9Liz Benston, Harrah’s, Caesars Ink Deal, Las Vegas Sun,
July 15, 2004, < http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2004/jul/
15/harrahs-caesars-ink-deal/ > .
10William R. Eadington, Analyzing the Trends in Gaming-
Based Tourism for the State of Nevada: Implications for Public
Policy and Economic Development, 15 UNLV Gaming Res.
& Rev. J. (2011).
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much business could make negotiations with ven-
dors and suppliers easier.
Finally, buying some of the competition would
mean less competition. In theory, casinos com-
pete by bidding to attract customers based on a
mix of superior product offerings, better customer
service, lower prices, and more generous casino
complimentaries. Marketing subsumes a large
portion of the average casino’s budget: in 2012,
for example, comp expenses accounted for nearly
28% of gross casino revenues for large Las Vegas
Strip casino resorts.11 Being able to eliminate
competitors through acquisition could, theoreti-
cally, mean that casinos could lower customer ser-
vice levels (i.e., get by with fewer employees and
slower service) and rein in their comp expenses.
With fewer options, disgruntled customers would
have less potential to bring their play (and spend)
elsewhere.
Those are three possible justifications for consol-
idation. Did those involved believe that the potential
benefits were worth the risks? And is there any way
to ‘‘keep score’’ by assessing the outcomes? As re-
sponsible managers, the directors and officers who
orchestrated the mergers that led to consolidation
on the Las Vegas Strip were motivated, first and
foremost, by their directive to ‘‘drive shareholder
value.’’ At the end of the day, they wanted to in-
crease their company’s total value and position it
for future growth. From that perspective, it should
be easy to determine whether consolidation has
helped individual companies by comparing its
stock price before and after the merger(s).
This simple approach, however, is complicated
by several unfortunate intrusions of reality. Har-
rah’s, after its 2006 leveraged buyout, was no longer
publicly traded, so that kind of before-and-after
comparison isn’t possible for more than a year
after the merger was completed. And the recession,
particularly from 2008 to 2010, hammered casino
stocks (and not without reason), making it difficult
to assess just what impact consolidation had on
the stock price.
But it might be worth examining, to see what the
immediate impact of consolidation was for MGM.
Initially, it was moderately favorable. In February
2000, before the Mirage Resorts acquisition was an-
nounced, MGM Grand’s stock price was approxi-
mately $10.50/share. By the middle of April,
about a month after the announcement, it had
climbed to over $14/share, and by June, it was
close to $17/share. In 2004, the June announcement
of the Mandalay Resort group merger did not appre-
ciably move the stock price: it remained in the $21
to $22/share range for much of the year. But as the
Las Vegas Strip real estate market heated up, the
stock price soared, to $36/share by December
2005. By November 2007, MGM Mirage was trad-
ing near $90/share.12
From there, recessionary woes and slumping
gaming and non-gaming revenues on the Las
Vegas Strip contributed to a collapse of the stock
price; plummeting through 2008 as if in free fall,
by March 2009 it was (briefly) below $2/share. By
the end of the year, it had recovered to over $11/
share, where it remained for the next three years.
Recently, the MGM has improved its position,
with the stock trading in the area of $15 for much
of 2013 (through May).13
It would be easy to blame the stock collapse on the
recession, writing it off as completely unrelated to
over-expansion within the Las Vegas Strip. Indeed,
other companies suffered similar stock woes during
the recession (see Table 3 and Figure 1). Wynn
Resorts, for example, saw its stock price decline
from over $150/share in October 2007 to under
$16/share in March 2009. But since then, the com-
pany has rebounded; by the middle of 2011, it had
passed its pre-recession peak and even broken the
$160/share mark, and despite a subsequent retreat
Table 3. Approximate Stock prices in dollars,
2004–2013 (selected data points)
MGM Wynn LVS
Dec-04 36 67 48
Dec-05 36 55 39
Dec-06 56 94 89
Oct-07 90 150 140
Dec-08 13 43 7
Mar-09 2 16 2
Dec-09 11 67 15
Dec-10 15 104 46
Dec-11 10 110 42
Dec-12 11 114 44
May-13 15 140 57
Source: Google Finance.
11The Average Big Las Vegas Strip Casino, 2012,UNLVCen-
ter for Gaming Research (2012), < http://gaming.unlv.edu/
reports/bigstripcasino2012.pdf > .
12 < https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:MGM > .
13 < https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:MGM > .
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from that high water mark, is still trading near $140/
share in May 2013.14
Las Vegas Sands, which owns the Venetian and
Palazzo on the Strip, has a similar, though more
muted, trajectory. In October 2007, its stock price
was near $140/share; by March 2009, it was trading
at less than $2/share. Since then, it has never
regained its pre-recession peak, but has consistently
remained above $50/share for the past several
months.15
So from a stock price standpoint, it seems that
investing heavily in a Las Vegas-centric acquisition
strategy has not delivered shareholder value. The
history of Caesars Entertainment Corporation’s
stock, which returned to trading in February 2012,
is instructive. After slumping through much of
2012, with its price falling below $5/share for a pe-
riod, in 2013 it has rebounded, and is now trading
just above its early value of $14/share.16
If the impact of the mergers on stock prices are
negative or, at the very least, ambiguous, it makes
sense to evaluate that impact on other factors.
Indeed, this is the strategy that MGM’s chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) Terri Lanni eventually embraced.
In his message to shareholders in MGM Mirage’s
2004 annual report, Lanni sounded the theme of
‘‘momentum.’’ He highlighted the company’s re-
cently signed merger agreement with the Mandalay
Resort Group and plans to develop Project CityCen-
ter as two of the ‘‘most significant announcements in
Las Vegas history,’’ which positioned his company
‘‘like no other company to take advantage of unsur-
passed growth opportunities in the most dynamic
gaming and entertainment market in the world.’’17
The merger was part of an overall growth strat-
egy, according to Lanni, that would make the
company more competitive and, ultimately, more
profitable:
The gaming industry in America is maturing,
and international expansion, while exciting
in select markets, remains challenging. As
a result, your company has pursued a growth
strategy that calls for maximizing the assets
we currently own and seeking prudent devel-
opment opportunities and strategic acquisi-
tions.
Upon completion of our merger with Man-
dalay, MGM MIRAGE will be the world’s
leading gaming and leisure company. The
combination will result in a well-capitalized
company uniquely situated to invest in its
current portfolio in addition to creating
new projects in the United States and around
the world. We believe this is an outstanding
transaction for the shareholders of both com-
panies.18
FIG. 1. Approximate stock prices in dollars, 2004–2013 (chart). Source: Google Finance.
14 < https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:WYNN > .
15 < https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:LVS> .
16 < https://www.google.com/finance?q=NYSE:CZR > .
17MGM Mirage, 2004 Annual Report 2 (2005).
18Id. at 3.
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A year later, Lanni was equally bullish, though he
shifted the emphasis from a strictly ‘‘shareholder
value’’ message to one that stressed a broader justi-
fication for the purchase:
As we considered the merger with Mandalay
Resort Group, we saw a company that matched
ours in many ways. By combining, we would be
able to offer the widest possible array of choices
for our customers and position ourselves to bet-
ter take advantage of the boundless opportuni-
ties for resort development on the Las Vegas
Strip and elsewhere. To do so, we had to be cer-
tain that our new colleagues from Mandalay
were made to feel welcome and secure in their
positions within MGM MIRAGE. The success
of the merger can be measured in many
ways—tremendous revenue growth and indus-
try-leading profit margins, for example.19
In Lanni’s words, the success of the merger would
be measured in two ways: revenue growth and profit
margins. Let’s examine both metrics for the compa-
nies separately and combined.
In the three-year period 2002–2004, the Manda-
lay Resort Group had an approximate average of
19,544 rooms on the Las Vegas Strip (including
its half-interest in the Monte Carlo). Its overall ca-
sino size remained constant at 580,700 square feet
and approximately 10,000 slot machines and 470
table games. Table 4 has precise numbers for each
of these metrics, as well as the key drivers that
Lanni highlighted: overall revenues and profit mar-
gins, here expressed as net income divided by net
revenues. In addition, basic earnings per share is
added as an additional metric of the utility of con-
solidation.
Since the financial filings do not separate out Las
Vegas Strip vs. non-Strip earnings, it is not possible
to say exactly how much of the total revenue and ul-
timate profit margin came from Las Vegas earnings,
but it was no doubt significant. For both income/
revenues and basic earnings/share, the pattern is
clear: profitability is increasing, with earnings per
share nearly doubling over the period and income/
revenues increasing by 66 percent.
MGMMIRAGE’s metrics show a slightly different
trajectory over the 2002–2004 period, as shown in
Table 5. While the income/revenues ratio remained
above the Mandalay Resort Group’s, basic earnings
per share failed to grow.
So, on the eve of the merger, Mandalay Resort
Group had gross revenues of $2.8 billion, while
MGM Mirage had gross revenues of $4 billion.
Profitability, measured as net income divided by
net revenues, was 8 percent and 10 percent, respec-
tively. Applying Lanni’s formula, one would expect
to see both increase following the merger. Table 6
shows what happened.
In fact, the total net revenues of MGM Mirage in
2005, $6.1 billion, was less than the combined 2004
revenues of the separate companies, $6.8 billion.
True, by the following year the company had
notched an increase to $7.2 billion, but this is likely
because of the over-heating Las Vegas market rather
than any synergies delivered by the merger. Simi-
larly, in 2005 income/revenue fell to 7.2 percent,
and while it soared in 2007 to 20.6 percent, it fell
in the following year to negative 11.9 percent. If
crediting the merger with the 2007 number, we
must also blame the merger for the 2008 number.
In sum, looking at the financial performance of
the companies separately and combined shows
that, in the period shown, the merger did not deliver
the benefits Lanni had claimed it would.
In addition, the merger, by providing the company
with vast tracts of un- and under-developed land on
the Las Vegas Strip, gave MGM the potential to con-
ceive and execute CityCenter. This 76-acre develop-
ment project, hailed as ‘‘transformative’’ for both the
Table 4. Key Metrics of Financial Strength, Mandalay Resort Group
Year Rooms Casino SF Slots Tables Net Revenue Net Income Income/Revenues Basic Earnings/Share
2002 18,799 580,700 10,565 481 2,354,118 115,603 4.91% 1.71
2003 19,916 580,700 10,062 475 2,491,099 149,847 6.02% 2.40
2004 19,916 580,700 9,970 464 2,809,143 229,062 8.15% 3.41
First four columns are for Las Vegas Strip alone; second four are for the entire company.
Source: Mandalay Resort Group 10-K Filings.
19MGM Mirage, 2005 Annual Report 2 (2006).
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company and the market, in fact did not significantly
grow visitation or revenues when it opened in Decem-
ber 2009 and, before its opening, nearly ended in fail-
ure. Though the Aria casino resort has gained traction
in recent years, the guiding premise of the project—
that the next horizon for Las Vegas gaming com-
panies was the development of residential and
mixed-use projects in the tourist corridor—has been
proven false. By enabling CityCenter, one could
argue, the concentration of so much Strip real estate
in one operator’s hands was a strategic misstep.
Yet MGM wasn’t the only company to swell
itself through acquisitions. What about the other?
Originally, its leaders were equally bullish on the
prospects for higher profits through acquisition.
Harrah’s CEO Gary Loveman offered three reasons
for the acquisition of Caesars Entertainment; his
justification can be more broadly applied to the
company’s overall policy of expansion through pur-
chase of existing assets: ‘‘These are the right assets
for the development of our strategy. Second, we be-
lieve these assets are worth more in our hands than
in our incumbent’s hands and third, we believe
we’ve acquired them at a reasonable price.20 Love-
man, then, based his (and his company’s) decisions
to acquire such a large Las Vegas footprint on three
factors: those assets’ utility for future development;
the ability of Harrah’s to manage the properties bet-
ter than their current owners; and the belief that they
were acquired at a good price. How well did subse-
quent events bear out these assumptions?
First, we must determine how well the acquisi-
tion sortie dovetailed with Harrah’s Entertainment’s
overall strategy. In its 2004 10-K report, the com-
pany reported that, ‘‘Harrah’s Entertainment’s strat-
egy for sustainable growth draws on the combined
strength of our broad geographic diversification,
customer rewards program, financial strength, inno-
vative technology and focus on superior customer
service. ’’21
There isn’t much room there for an expansion of
the company’s Las Vegas footprint. Indeed, in its
2003 annual report, CEO Gary Loveman signed
his name to the statement that, ‘‘The linchpins of
our growth strategy are the company’s unparalleled
geographic breadth, marketing expertise, techno-
logical innovations, financial strength and delivery
of great customer service by dedicated employ-
ees.’’22 This would indicate that the moves Harrah’s
pursued over the next two years—namely, dramati-
cally increasing its exposure to Las Vegas, forgoing
expansion into Asia, and exponentially increasing
its debt load—was not part of a long-term strategy.
Indeed, the 2003 annual report devotes a page to
explicitly explaining what would drive the compa-
ny’s future growth:
In just 10 years, we’ve grown into one of the
world’s largest gaming companies through a
focus on strategic expansion and acquisition.
Table 5. Key Metrics of Financial Strength, MGM MIRAGE
Year Rooms Casino SF Slots Tables Net Revenues Net Income Income/Revenues Basic Earnings/Share
2002 19,649 735,500 14,259 657 4,031,295 292,435 7.25% 1.85
2003 19,648 735,500 13,996 666 3,908,816 243,697 6.23% 1.59
2004 20,577 735,500 13,032 657 4,001,804 412,332 10.30% 1.48
First four columns are for Las Vegas Strip alone; second four are for the entire company.
Source: MGM MIRAGE 10-K Filings.
Table 6. Key Metrics of Financial Strength, MGM MIRAGE, Post-Merger
Year Rooms Casino SF Slots Tables Net Revenues Net Income Income/Revenues Basic Earnings/Share
2005 36,845 1,195,000 20,304 1,027 6,128,843 443,256 7.23% 1.56
2006 37,605 1,182,000 20,063 1,020 7,175,956 648,264 9.03% 2.55
2007 37,696 1,182,000 19,335 994 7,691,637 1,584,419 20.60% 4.88
2008 38,055 1,186,000 18,564 981 7,208,767 - 855,286 - 11.86% - 3.06
First four columns are for Las Vegas Strip alone; second four are for the entire company.
Source: MGM MIRAGE 10-K Filings.
20Liz Benston, Harrah’s, Caesars Ink Deal, supra note 8.
21Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. 10-K Report (2004),
< http://www.getfilings.com/o0001047469-05-005121.html > .
22Harrah’s Entertainment. 2003 Annual Report (2004).
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But the Harrah’s growth story is hardly at an
end. Opportunities for growth abound in the
United States—in Indian Country, where
we’re exploring new tribal partnerships, and
in states considering the introduction or ex-
pansion of commercial casino gaming. And
across the Atlantic, we’re poised to take ad-
vantage of exciting possibilities in the United
Kingdom raised by the gaming liberalization
legislation recommended by the U.K. govern-
ment.
The Harrah’s growth story: We’ve only just
begun.23
Again, there is no mention of exponentially increas-
ing the company’s presence on the Las Vegas Strip.
The acquisition of Caesars Entertainment, then, was
not part of an existing long-term strategy, particu-
larly since its expanded the company’s presence in
two markets where it already had invested signifi-
cantly, Las Vegas and Atlantic City.
It’s possible, though, that in response to changing
market conditions, the company shifted its strategy.
Whatever the motivations, Harrah’s now began
investing in Las Vegas real estate in a big way, buy-
ing more than twenty parcels behind its core East
Strip properties as well as the small Bourbon Street
hotel and casino on Flamingo Road, which it closed
and imploded, and the Barbary Coast, which it
swapped with owner Boyd Gaming for another
site on the Las Vegas Strip. Harrah’s now focused
on a master redevelopment plan that would tie to-
gether the company’s various resorts in a way,
CEO Gary Loveman explained in May 2006, similar
to Disneyland.24 Although Loveman offered no spe-
cifics, in September, details of Harrah’s Las Vegas
plans trickled out. As assembled on VegasTripping.
com, the company’s strategy appeared to be to
implode, in phases, both the Imperial Palace and
Harrah’s, building a new ‘‘Harrah’s America’’
mega-resort there; expanding the Flamingo to the
Barbary Coast site and further east; rebuilding and
rebranding Bally’s as the Horseshoe Las Vegas.25
Whether that strategy would have worked had the
recession not happened is unknown, but it is an ex-
ample of the more grandiose vision that consolida-
tion enabled in Las Vegas. Similar to MGM’s
development of CityCenter, Harrah’s pursued
grand, and capital-intensive, designs. By 2013, it
was clear that the major redevelopment of Caesars’
Strip properties would never take place, with the ex-
pansive Harrah’s America plan being replaced by
the more modest Linq, a retail/entertainment district
between the Flamingo and the former Imperial Pal-
ace (now renamed The Quad) and the redevelop-
ment of the former Barbary Coast/Bill’s into the
high-end Gansevoort Las Vegas, with the massive
tracts of land behind the casinos held for surface
parking and potential future developments.
The second rationale given for Harrah’s un-
wonted Strip buying spree was that with its Total
Rewards customer loyalty program, the com-
pany would be able to run the resorts it acquired
more profitably, with the added benefit of lower
back-end costs due to consolidation of back-of-
the-house services. It is difficult to objectively
determine just how well this theory was borne
out by actual events, since the decline in revenues
faced by all of Harrah’s Las Vegas properties in the
late 2000s is due primarily to the recession, rather
than problems with Total Rewards integration.
While it’s possible to argue that the properties
would have declined more had they not been part
of Total Rewards, that kind of statement is inher-
ently unfalsifiable, and shouldn’t be given much
consideration. From the data available, it seems
clear that Total Rewards did not immunize Har-
rah’s/Caesars against the malaise that afflicted
Las Vegas from 2008 to 2011. Indeed, the debt
load brought on by consolidation and the subse-
quent leveraged buy-out impeded the company
from responding to the new recessionary pressures,
forced it into a deferred maintenance cycle that di-
minished the perceived value of its properties, and
forestalled (for a short time) reinvestment in its
portfolio.
The third rationale for acquisition, that Harrah’s
received good value for its purchases, it similarly
debatable. The company paid a ‘‘reasonable price’’
relative to what? Loveman did not specify. In fact,
the opportunity costs of investing so heavily in
23Id.
24Jeff Simpson, Jeff Simpson on Harrah’s Plan to Transform
the Center Strip, Las Vegas Sun, May 28, 2006, < http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2006/may/28/jeff-simpson-on-
harrahs-plan-to-transform-the-cent > .
25Chuckmonster, Harrahs To Blow Up Everything Except Cae-
sars, Flamingo and Paris, VegasTripping (Sept. 21, 2006,




Strip real estate, even if it did not so heavily load the
company with debt (to the extent that, after other
Strip-based operators have returned to profitability,
it continues to lose money on a quarterly basis),
were significant, and involved moving away from
the strategy that had guided the company to impres-
sive growth and financial stability over the previous
two decades.
While the rationales for consolidation on the
Strip and the bar for success that Loveman set
were more subjective than those Lanni did, it ap-
pears from the perspective of 2013 that, even from
a generous reading of those rationales, concentra-
tion on the Las Vegas Strip did not help Caesars
Entertainment. In fact, by diverting resources that
could have been used to penetrate the Asian market,
pursue other development opportunities, or maxi-
mize a smaller Strip footprint, concentration ap-
pears to have been the wrong strategy. Because
much of the debt load that has slowed the company
was taken on by the leveraged buy-out rather than
the expansion strategy itself, however, it is difficult
to say conclusively just how much of a misstep Strip
expansion was. Thankfully, Harrah’s did not begin
its massive East Strip redevelopment project in
2007; had it done so, it would have been in the
early stages during the worst years of the recession
and probably would have forced the company into
bankruptcy.
In general, it appears that neither of the two com-
panies that chose to acquire massive Strip portfolios
have really benefited from it. In MGM’s case, the
promised boost in overall revenues and profit mar-
gins did not materialize, and in Caesars’, none of
the three rationales given for expansion on the
Strip has been achieved (to the extent that they
can be objectively determined at all). These compa-
nies’ acquisition of such large segments of the Las
Vegas Strip market, in the end, was not beneficial
to them.
IMPACT ON THE INDUSTRY
AS A WHOLE
If the concentration strategy has not, to date, de-
livered the dividends to the two companies that
was originally promised, it’s still possible that
the consolidation of ownership on the Las Vegas
Strip has been beneficial for the industry as a
whole. In theory, the more successful the consoli-
dation, the more difficult for those companies on
the outside. Larger companies could use their
economies of scale and pooling of back-end
labor to run more efficiently than single-owned re-
sorts; they then could offer rooms, dining, and en-
tertainment (in theory) at lower costs, effectively
undercutting the competition. Indeed, that’s what
public administration professor William Thomp-
son alluded to when he stated that the mergers
would provide, ‘‘a vehicle to help the consumer
and give them a better deal.’’26 His biggest concern
was that casinos not part of the combination, like
the Sahara and Riviera, would find it difficult to
compete—not that either consumers or the big
companies themselves could be negatively im-
pacted by consolidation.
Again, because of the ensuing recession, it is dif-
ficult to separate out the fallout from concentration
from the general malaise of the past several years.
Looking at the general revenue trend in the period
1998–2012 (Table 7), it appears that there have
been larger forces shaping the Strip’s economic des-
tiny. Concentration occurred at the mid-point of the
Las Vegas Strip’s 2003–2007 boom, when gaming
revenues soared despite a contraction in the number
of slot machines and a decrease in the overall num-
ber of properties.
The impact of the recession, from which the
Strip’s gaming revenues have still not recovered,
is apparent here. But it is also interesting that even
before the start of the recession, gaming revenues
were no longer rising at the rate which they had
been earlier in the decade. The concentration of re-
sorts under MGM and Caesars did not, even before
the start of the recession, cause any noticeable rise
in gaming revenues. From a purely revenue-genera-
tion standpoint, it is clear that the Great Concentra-
tion did not engender any benefits for the Las Vegas
Strip as a whole: it is possible that the combined
companies were able to secure a greater slice of
the revenue pie for themselves, but they did not
grow that pie.
But it is possible that concentration could
have helped the Strip without increasing reve-
nues. One of the justifications for super-sizing
Caesars and MGM was that with their mega-stables
of resorts, the companies could drive down back-of-
26Benston, Harrah’s, Caesars Ink Deal, supra note 8.
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the-house expenses. Did they actually do so? Table
8 examines how general and administrative ex-
penses tracked in the period 1998–2012.
As can be seen, interest payments began climb-
ing rapidly in the period after consolidation—rising
to over $1.6 billion in fiscal 2006, as overall general
and administrative expenses broken the $8 billion
barrier.
The numbers provide the raw data, but looking at
the percentage change gives the context. Table 9
examines the changes in the percentage of total in-
terest expenses, ‘‘other’’ expenses, and total general
and administrative expenses. As can be seen, inter-
est expense, which had been falling from its turn-
of-the-millennium peak, had been falling before
the merger wave, when it began to rise again.
And total general and administrative expenses
rose as well, though not as rapidly as they would
later in the decade.
Total general and administrative expenses rose
more sharply in the period 2006–2008 (i.e., pre-re-
cession) than they had in the earlier part of the de-
cade. This signals that, overall, the mergers did
not drive down general and administrative expenses
for the Las Vegas Strip as a whole.
On a qualitative level, there is conflicting evi-
dence as to whether concentration has helped or
hurt the Strip market. Treasure Island, which billi-
onaire Phil Ruffin bought from MGM MIRAGE in
2008, was able to weather the worst of the recession
Table 8. Las Vegas Strip Reporting Area, General and Administrative Expenses,
Net Income before Federal Income Tax
Interest Other Total G&A Expenses NI before FIT
FY98 355,016,030 736,926,026 4,280,638,095 1,134,328,500
FY99 726,490,641 920,715,360 5,182,092,784 876,587,138
FY00 1,103,493,878 1,261,548,953 6,567,298,320 496,841,799
FY01 1,417,991,135 1,030,103,785 6,827,152,666 554,428,461
FY02 1,188,124,549 1,398,962,375 7,001,423,019 (33,541,881)
FY03 1,107,657,101 1,068,074,897 6,646,523,901 845,391,717
FY04 1,157,878,424 1,320,170,396 7,062,701,442 1,325,046,548
FY05 1,187,086,239 1,380,964,187 7,583,636,578 1,803,736,903
FY06 1,604,545,938 1,608,511,426 8,469,265,843 2,110,643,824
FY07 1,678,149,046 1,568,764,555 8,658,521,898 2,297,481,525
FY08 2,115,571,482 1,996,565,129 10,061,731,907 721,181,848
FY09 2,727,968,923 6,808,210,384 15,453,284,434 (6,778,293,613)
FY10 2,676,024,160 2,773,112,695 11,467,783,408 (3,432,514,103)
FY11 3,007,197,013 3,396,732,518 12,587,135,512 (3,996,656,422)
FY12 2,991,566,001 1,331,588,473 10,278,702,854 (1,212,990,361)
Source: Nevada Gaming Control Board, UNLV Center for Gaming Research.
Table 7. Las Vegas Strip Reporting Area Game, Slot, and Total Revenues, 1998–2012
Year #Loc # Games Game Revenue # Slots Slot Revenue Total Revenue % D
1998 44 2,316 1,844,678 55,581 1,940,350 3,812,630 0.09%
1999 44 2,562 2,250,757 60,169 2,206,197 4,488,657 17.73%
2000 43 2,683 2,392,702 61,433 2,380,945 4,805,059 7.05%
2001 44 2,677 2,280,570 61,867 2,393,837 4,703,692 - 2.11%
2002 43 2,566 2,186,144 58,930 2,439,002 4,654,808 - 1.04%
2003 44 2,595 2,165,026 57,548 2,558,574 4,759,607 2.25%
2004 45 2,620 2,414,300 56,035 2,864,537 5,333,508 12.06%
2005 44 2,710 2,777,651 55,448 3,171,258 6,033,595 13.13%
2006 41 2,718 3,159,584 52,372 3,435,441 6,688,903 10.86%
2007 38 2,701 3,228,487 49,891 3,502,333 6,827,887 2.08%
2008 42 2,737 2,821,047 50,158 3,214,871 6,126,292 - 10.28%
2009 43 2,736 2,656,451 49,476 2,808,617 5,550,192 - 9.40%
2010 42 2,802 2,904,826 49,352 2,789,753 5,776,570 4.08%
2011 43 2,817 3,099,492 48,698 2,888,527 6,068,959 5.06%
2012 42 2,741 3,223,270 46,364 2,908,471 6,207,230 2.28%
Data includes number of locations, games, slots, game revenue, slot revenue, total revenue, and annual percentage change in total revenue.
Source: Nevada Gaming Control Board, UNLV Center for Gaming Research.
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while continually reinvesting in its physical plant
and offering competitive prices to visitors. The Riv-
iera, on the other hand, has not fared so well, with its
annual loss widening from $13 million in 2010 to
$16 million in 2011.27 The owners of the Tropicana
invested substantially ($141 million) in 2010–2012,
renovating over 1,300 hotel rooms, remodeling the
casino and convention area, opening new restau-
rants, and partnering with two successive compa-
nies to create a nightclub complex. In 2012, the
casino lost $44 million; by 2012 the Tropicana
had pared its annual loss to $34 million.28 This
was hardly a sign of great improvement, but with
revenues increasing and the operating loss shrink-
ing, the hotel appears to be on the right track.
If Mandalay Resort Group and MGM MIRAGE
had not combined, would the companies separately
have been able to handle current Las Vegas climate
better? It is possible but not certain. Mandalay
would still not have access to Asia, though on a per-
centage basis, both companies would have had less
exposure to Las Vegas with their broader U.S. port-
folios (MGM sold the MotorCity casino in Detroit,
in which Mandalay had an interest). Neither com-
pany on its own would have attempted a project
on the scale of CityCenter, which would have
meant capital diverted to other purposes, including
better maintaining and enhancing existing resorts.
For Harrah’s Entertainment and Caesars Enter-
tainment, neither of which had any exposure to
Asia, it is likely that both companies, separately,
could have weathered the recession better; certainly
Harrah’s would have gotten through the recession
better with only two casinos in Las Vegas and At-
lantic City, respectively, and could have taken ad-
vantage of depressed prices to acquire a third
property and rebrand it as a Horseshoe. In other
words, the company could have better adhered to
the strategy outlined by Loveman in 2003 and
2004 without having assembled such a large Strip
portfolio. For the Strip as a whole, that would
have meant a more vibrant competitor in Harrah’s,
though Caesars, without Harrah’s Total Rewards
network, might have had a more difficult time find-
ing customers for its properties.
In general, the evidence seems to suggest that the
Strip, as a whole, would have been better off with
more owners of fewer casinos than two large com-
panies dominating the market. There is definitely
a benefit to the market in having a company like
Harrah’s with a strong nationwide loyalty network
to funnel visitors to the Strip, but whether having
one or two companies with such a network domi-
nate the Strip provides a benefit to the market at
large that justifies the concentration remains to be
proven.
THE IMPACT ON THE CONSUMER
EXPERIENCE
One of the justifications most frequently ad-
vanced for the accelerated concentration of owner-
ship on the Las Vegas Strip was the benefit to the
public. As has been mentioned above, in theory at
least, with back-end expenses spread across a
greater number of frontline positions, companies
with larger holdings can deliver superior customer
service and lower prices. Larger companies also
have a better strategic position to negotiate with
vendors and suppliers, leading to further cost sav-
ings. This is not a trivial point in the Las Vegas
Strip gaming/resort market, where expenses for a
variety of goods and services, from laundering of
linens to food and beverage to slot machines, consti-
tutes a significant portion of expenses.
Yet concentration can also potentially have a neg-
ative impact on the consumer experience. With
fewer separate owners competing for business,
Table 9. Las Vegas Strip, Percentage Change for
General and Administrative Expenses, 1999–2012
Interest % Other % Total %
FY99 104.64% 24.94% 21.06%
FY00 51.89% 37.02% 26.73%
FY01 28.50% - 18.35% 3.96%
FY02 - 16.21% 35.81% 2.55%
FY03 - 6.77% - 23.65% - 5.07%
FY04 4.53% 23.60% 6.26%
FY05 2.52% 4.60% 7.38%
FY06 35.17% 16.48% 11.68%
FY07 4.59% - 2.47% 2.23%
FY08 26.07% 27.27% 16.21%
FY09 28.95% 241.00% 53.58%
FY10 - 1.90% - 59.27% - 25.79%
FY11 12.38% 22.49% 9.76%
FY12 - 0.52% - 60.80% - 18.34%
Source: Nevada Gaming Control Board, UNLV Center for Gaming
Research.
27Riveria Holding Corporation. 10-K Report (2011).
28Tropicana Las Vegas Hotel & Casino, Inc. Annual 10-
K Report (2012).
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prices tend to be higher. This is true both for visitors
booking leisure trips through the Internet and, to a
much more serious degree, for business and conven-
tion groups. There is a tremendous difference be-
tween negotiating for a block of rooms with seven
or eight companies and doing so with four. Smaller
groups in particular may have been hurt by over-
concentration.
Table 10 examines the trend in visitor volume,
occupancy rates, and the average daily rate of a
Las Vegas hotel room. If concentration truly leads
to ‘‘a better deal’’ for customers, we should see a no-
ticeable drop in room rates after 2005.
As can be seen, room rates actually rose at a
greater rate after concentration on the Las Vegas
Strip than before. The great drop in rates in 2008
to 2009 was not because of cost savings engineered
by concentration and passed on to customers—it
was because of the decline in visitation, which,
when combined with the continued addition of
new room product to the market, led to profoundly
lower occupancy rates. Room rates correlate far
more strongly with occupancy rates than with any
other factor: as occupancy rates increase, room
rates increase, and when they fall, room rates fall.
This is not a hard concept to grasp—indeed, it is
nearly intuitive—but it raises the question of why
many people in 2004 and 2005 thought that an un-
related factor, consolidated ownership, would trig-
ger a decline in overall room rates.
Along with higher room rates, the other bugaboo
faced by Las Vegas visitors in the post-consolidation
era is the rise of resort fees. These mandatory add-
ons are not restricted to Las Vegas. Typically, they
cover goods and services of small to marginal
value to most guests: a copy of the local newspaper,
‘‘free’’ local calls, a bottle of water, and free parking
are among the amenities some hotels list. Some of
the items, though, are of value to certain guests:
these include wifi access and a pass for the hotel
gym. On the whole, however, guests forced to pay
resort fees find themselves with a pig in the poke,
the beneficiaries of services that they didn’t ask
for and may not use.
Resort fees surfaced in the period 2001–02 in
generally higher-priced markets nationwide, and
started to gain traction in Las Vegas in 2009.29
For hotels, the fees are a way of ‘‘painlessly’’ adding
revenue—revenue that is not subject to the room-
rate commissions charged by online booking sites.
The revenue impact can be substantial. For exam-
ple, in the third quarter of 2010, MGM Resorts gen-
erated more than $20 million from resort fees.30 At
the height of the recession, resort fees seemed like
a boon to casino executives bedeviled by falling
revenues—particularly for a company that had bor-
rowed too much to finance expansion to meet a mar-
ket that had evaporated.
Initially, MGM Resorts did not charge resort fees
at all of its properties: the high-end resorts, particu-
larly the Bellagio and Aria, did not assess the fee,
while others did. But, with the company needing
revenue and revenue per available room dragging,
by January 2011 the company introduced the fee
at Bellagio, making it omnipresent throughout its
Las Vegas portfolio of resorts.31 If customers
wanted to stay at an MGM hotel, they had to pay
a mandatory, extra fee of $5 to $25 per day, often
for services they had no desire to use.
There’s no direct correlation between consolida-
tion and the appearance of resort fees in Las Vegas:
yes, MGM Resorts was on the early slope of the
bell curve in adopting them, but a range of ‘‘indepen-
dent’’ casinos, from the Venetian/Palazzo to Treasure
Island, adopted them as well. But it certainly makes it
easier to implement the fee if management knows
that, with one fell swoop, all of its properties can
make the fee a standard part of a Vegas vacation.
Indeed, Caesars Entertainment sought to differ-
entiate itself with a blanket policy of not charging
Table 10. Las Vegas Visitors, Total Occupancy,
and Average Daily Room Rate, 2003–2012
Year Visitors Occupancy ADR %D
2003 35,540,126 85.00% 82.48 –
2004 37,388,781 88.60% 89.78 8.85%
2005 38,566,717 89.20% 103.12 14.86%
2006 38,914,889 89.70% 119.66 16.04%
2007 39,196,761 90.40% 132.09 10.39%
2008 37,481,552 86.00% 119.19 - 9.77%
2009 36,351,469 81.50% 92.93 - 22.03%
2010 37,335,436 80.40% 94.91 2.13%
2011 38,928,708 83.80% 105.11 10.75%
2012 39,727,022 84.40% 108.08 2.83%
Source: Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority.
29David G. Schwartz, Las Vegas’ Resort-Fee Game Gets Inter-
esting, Vegas Seven, Feb. 9, 2010.
30Liz Bentson, The Next to Charge a Resort Fee in Las Vegas:





resort fees at any of its Las Vegas properties. In
early 2010, it began an aggressive advertising cam-
paign highlighting this policy.32 It may have been a
public relations success, but in early 2013, the com-
pany reversed course, and on March 1, it began
charging mandatory resort fees at all of its proper-
ties. In a May 1, 2013, conference call, CEO Gary
Loveman said that, ‘‘we became persuaded that
the time had come to institute those fees ourselves,’’
after a prolonged analysis of the question.33 And,
with that decision, virtually every Las Vegas Strip
property had a resort fee.
Issues stemming from consolidation extend to the
gaming floor as well. For serious gamblers, one of
concentration’s most inimitable effects has been
the proliferation of lower game odds. The game of
blackjack is a flashpoint for such concerns. Starting
in 2005, Harrah’s Las Vegas began offering 6/5
blackjack.34 In essence, this is a modified version
of the classic casino game in which players are
paid 6 to 5 instead of 3 to 2 for a ‘‘natural’’ black-
jack, i.e., a ten-value card and an ace. This results
in a 20 percent lower payout on blackjacks, skewing
the overall odds of the game.
In a competitive market, one casino offering such
odds might be shunned by serious gamblers. In ad-
dition, casinos might be hesitant to introduce a
game with reduced (for the player) odds because
of fears that they might see a reduction in business.
But with the ability to introduce such games at ten
properties, the risk to the owner seems lower.
Indeed, by 2010 all of Caesars Entertainment’s
properties were offering 6/5 blackjack, substantiat-
ing the concerns of gamblers that consolidated own-
ership would lead to worse odds for players.35 Of
course, it would have been just as easy for a larger
group of owners to imitate a single casino whose
bottom line was improved by 6/5 blackjack, but
the perception of players—right or wrong—is that
concentration has led to the quicker proliferation
of games like 6/5 blackjack.
Thus, looking at both room rates and game odds
shows that concentration has not helped, and may
have hurt, the overall consumer experience on the
Las Vegas Strip. Are there any benefits from the
consolidation trend to visitors? In fact, there may
be at least one area where concentration has likely
improved how visitors to Las Vegas spend their
time in the city: loyalty programs.
Being able to accrue points and receive benefits
from ten resorts, each with its own roster of restau-
rants, entertainment, and other amenities, is, all
other things being equal, better than being able to
do so at one or two resorts. Without concentration,
we would not see programs like Caesars Entertain-
ment’s Buffet of Buffets, which grants Total
Rewards members access to eight buffets across
its Strip portfolio for 24 hours, starting at $49.99.
Offering a wide array of options to customers,
with many places to both earn and spend points, is
a bonus for customers. Whether the added utility
of the broader scope of two large loyalty programs
makes up for the lower prices and greater diversity
that might have been found with a larger number of
operators, however, is not a given.
CONCLUSIONS
While there are some areas where concentration
has benefited the Strip, for the most part it did not
deliver the benefits that its architects had promised,
and it likely exacerbated the recession’s impact. It is
difficult to ascertain the exact nature of concen-
tration’s role in the industry’s recession and post-
recession woes, but examining data from the period
just after the final concentration boom of 2004–05
and before the recession suggests that it did not
lead to significant growth in revenues, and that, in
fact, MGM Mirage, at least, saw a decline in its
profit margins following its merger with the Manda-
lay Resort Group.
Individually, the transactions passed muster with
the companies’ boards of directors and shareholders
and gaming regulators. Collectively, however, their
impact on the operators themselves, the industry as
a whole, and the consumer has been a net negative.
It’s unclear whether this means Nevada regulators
need to reevaluate the criteria they use to determine
if an acquisition would ‘‘pose problems’’ or if leg-
islators need to create a statutory definition of
32Schwartz, supra note 28.
33Caesars Entertainment Management Discusses Q1 2013
Results—Earnings Call Transcript, Seeking Alpha (May 1,
2013, 22:10), < http://seekingalpha.com/article/1392251-cae-
sars-entertainment-management-discusses-q1-2013-results-
earnings-call-transcript > .
34Liz Benston, Blackjack With Poorer Payouts Making Head-
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over-concentration, either as a percentage of the
market or an absolute number of resorts, gaming po-
sitions, or hotel rooms.
For operators, the lessons should be clear: while
the individual decisions to assemble such large port-
folios of Strip resorts and real estates were sup-
ported by mounds of analysis, those who pursued
the acquisitions seem to have lost sight of the larger
picture—which is that in addition to the easily quan-
tifiable potential benefits of concentration, those ac-
quisitions presented risks as well. Even if the
recession had not intervened, it is likely that con-
centration would not have delivered the promised
dividends. That it loosened inhibitions for both
companies to undertake projects that, in MGM’s
case, left it moments from bankruptcy (but which
Harrah’s never built as originally proposed) was
an unforeseen drawback.
In essence, the history of the concentration trend
on the Las Vegas Strip suggests that just because an
operator can do something, it is by no means certain
that it should. Companies that pursued a more bal-
anced Strip strategy have been rewarded with stronger
balance sheets, while those who went ‘‘all in’’ have,
hopefully, developed decision-making processes that
will avoid similar errors in judgment in the future.
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